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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 
THE STATE OF UTAH 
GILBERT N. ANDERSON and his 
wife, ELLA B. ANDERSON, 
Plaintiffs and Respondents. 
vs. 
E. VAL ANDERSON, 
Defendant, and Appellant 
RESPONDENT'S 
BRIEF 
Case No. 9854 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
FACTS AND NATURE OF CASE 
Plaintiffs brought this action to have an escrow con-
tract terminated and title quieted to 133 acres of irrigated 
farm land in Cache County, Utah, for failure by the de-
fendant to make payments alleged to be under the terms 
of the said contract. ( F -3,) (Court File page 3). 
There was no question of forfeiture because there 
was no interest charge for the first year under the terms 
of the contract, and the $1,000 paid in two payments dur-
ing the first year was less than the amount of interest 
and less than rental value. The record does not contain 
a transcript of evidence, but only the preliminary dis-
cussion of the Court and counsel when the case was 
called for trial when the Court sought to find a com-
promise so that the defendant would agree to pay for 
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the property with interest. The discussion was carried 
on for a substantial part of the forenoon, during which 
time the plaintiffs made offers to reinstate the contract 
if an agreement could be reached that would pay for the 
land. (Record 4 to 25) No such agreement was reached, 
and we take issue with the statement of the appellant 
at page two of their brief that plaintiffs stipulated that, 
"The defendant had paid all that was required by the 
contract.', 
The purchase price under the contract for the pro-
perty was $26,500.00, which sum was agreed to be paid 
by the purchaser as follows: 
"$500, May 1, 1959; $500, December 1, 1959; $1000, 
October 1, 1960; $1,000 each October 1 thereafter 
until the full purchase price with interest on all de-
ferred payments at the rate of 4:*% per annum from 
January 1, 1960, all payments to be applied first to 
the payment of accrued interest to date of payment 
and the balance on the principal. Option to buyer 
to pay any additional amount at any time." ( F 5) 
Plaintiffs contended that the above language should 
be considered to mean the payment of $1,000 on the prin-
cipal, plus interest. The defendant contended that the 
language was clear and only required the defendant to 
pay $1,000 per year, even though this was not enough to 
pay the interest as clearly provided in the language above 
quoted. ( R-3) 
The case was commenced in August, 1962. (F 1-4) 
Before it came to trial, the October payment was due. 
At that time the defendant made a written tender of 
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payment which was set-up by a supplemental complaint 
and as additional grounds for terminating the contract 
as follows: 
4. "That the defendant failed and refused to pay 
any part of either of the said payments, but in lieu 
thereof the defendant on October 1, 1962, pretended 
to tender the sum of $1,000 in currency as of this 
date as full payment of the deferred payments pro-
vided for under the escrow contract above referred 
to be due October 1, 1962. In this connection the 
plaintiff alleged that the defendant has no right to 
make any such conditional tender, that the contract 
gave them no right to make any such conditional 
offer. The offer was refused. However, the plain-
tiffs offered to accept the $1,000 and credit it on the 
contract and wait the determination of the court as 
to what amounts might be due. Defendant refused 
to leave the tender, and Plaintiffs allege on infor-
mation and belief that tender has not been kept good 
or made good." (F-29) 
To the above allegation the defendant in his supple-
mental answer, answered as follows: 
3. "Defendant alleges that on the 1st day of October, 
1962, the defendant tendered to the plaintiffs, the 
sum of of One Thousand Dollars ($1,000.00) cash as 
full payment of the deferred payment provided for 
under the Escrow Contract due October 1, 1962, and 
alleges that the said amount was the full amount due 
under said contract, that other than above provided 
the defendant denies the allegations of paragraph 4 
of the plaintiffs amended and supplemental com-
plaint." ( F23) 
The defendant refused to make any payment that 
would pay the interest or any part of the principal. This 
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put the defendant in the place where he, in effect, refused 
to buy or pay for the farm, but insisted he had a right 
to keep it by paying at the rate of $1,000 per year. 
At page 2 of appellant's brief, he states: 
"The effect of the contract is basically that of the 
yearly payments provided fall short of paying the 
interest on the principal If the minimum payments 
were made, the defendant would be entitled to pos-
session and the profits from the land perpetually; but 
the contract would not be paid out unless the buyer 
exercises his option to pay sufficiently more on the 
principal so that the payments would more than cover 
the interest." 
ISSUE TO BE DETERMINED 
Did the lower Court err in holding that this contract 
for purchase of land, because of the unrestricted option 
given to the defendant to pay more at any time, violate 
the rule against Perpetuities? 
ARGUMENT 
The defendant elected to stand on the proposition 
that this language is clear and unambiguous, and can have 
only one possible meaning, viz. Buyer is required to 
pay $1,000 per year on the contract and nothing more. 
POINT 1. LOWER COURT PROPERLY CON-
STRUED THIS CONTRACT. 
Plaintiff's contend that there is ambiguity in the 
language and that the Court should not permit counsel 
to limit the language to tl1e $1,000 payment and "nothing 
more." But that the express language used shows that 
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the language of the contract expressly and by necessary 
and reasonable implication does require more than $1,000 
payment each year. 
It is to be regretted that the contract does contain 
language that can be described as ambiguous. 
No one wishes to write a contract which requires 
interpretation, and it would be nice if every contract con-
tained just exactly in definite terms all that the parties 
intended and no more than was intended. As a practical 
matter, very few perfect contracts are written. The 
Courts are required to interpret the language used in 
contracts for the purpose of determing the intent of the 
parties. 
In the first place, this was a contract intended to be 
a contract of sale by a person willing to sell to a person 
willing to purchase and pay the agreed purchase price 
for the property. 
The difficulty arises out of the language used in at-
tempting to detail the manner and amount of payments 
of the purchase price. The contract clearly calls for pay-
ment of interest on the deferred payments at the rate of 
4~% per annum from January 1, 1960. It further provides 
that payment should be applied to payment of accnted 
interest and the BALANCE ON THE PRINCIPAL. 
The first difficulty with the defendant's claimed con-
struction is that $1,000 a year will not pay the accrued 
interest. Interest on $25,640, at the rate of 43~% per 
annum is $1150.38. Each year since 1960, the defendant 
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has refused to pay $150 (in round numbers) interest 
accrued on the contract price and nothing on the prin-
cipaL 
The interpretation of defendant does violence to 
the language agreeing to pay interest and also to the 
additional language "and the balance on the principal." 
The net result of defendant's contention is that he would 
never even pay the interest provided for and never pay 
the principal or any part thereof. Any such construction, 
we contend, could not possibly be in accordance with the 
intention of the parties and would be void for uncertainty. 
If two constructions are possible under the language 
of the contract, the Court will adopt the one that is legal 
and workable if such can be done without doing violence 
to the principles of justice and equity. 
The theory of the plaintiffs is that the language means 
that the buyer agrees to pay $1,000 per year and the 
jnterest provided for in the contract each year. It is our 
contention that interest will be presumed to be intended 
to be paid unless there is an express provision that no 
interest is intended. To require the purchaser in this 
case to pay the interest at a modest rate of 4*% per 
annum, plus $1,000 on the principal is not only fair, reason-
able and just, but allows him the very liberal term of 25 
years after January, 1960, to pay for the property. It 
was never contended that this was an unreasonable con-
tract. 
17 C. J. S. 682 states: 
"The law provides certain rules of construction to 
aid in determination as to the obligation of parties 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
-7-
under contracts which are ambiguous." 
At pages 685-86 it continues: 
"A contract is ambiguous when and only when it is 
reasonably or fairly susceptible of different construc-
tions ... even an apparent unambiguous contract may 
be rendered ambiguous and open to construction if 
its words, taken literally lead to absurity or illegality 
when applied to the facts. In determining whether 
or not there is such an ambiguity as calls for inter-
pretation, the whole instrument must be considered 
and not an isolated part." 
At page 689 it further states: 
"The primary rule of construction is that the Court 
must, if possible, ascertain and give effect to the 
mutual intention of the parties as of the time the 
contract is made as it may be done without contra-
vening legal principals and statutes or public policy." 
The case of Udy vs. Jenson, Utah 1924, 222 Pac. 
597-98, 63 U. 94 applies these same rules and concluded a 
written contract proporting to be a contract to purchase 
the capital stock of a company was a mere option and not 
a contract to purchase stock. From this case we quote the 
following: 
"The provision in the contract that 'this agreement 
shall not be binding upon the party of the first part 
for any of his property whatsover, but the party of 
second part shall hold the certificates of stock until 
paid for by the party of the first part' cannot be dis-
regarded because it is a part of the contract and has 
a definite signification. By saying that the agreement 
shall not be binding upon the first party for any of 
his property whatsoever is equivalent to saying that 
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the agreement to purchase should not be binding 
upon him at all because it is only by resort to his pro-
perty that such an agreement could be enforced 
against him. The form of expression is inept and 
awkward, but in the light of circumstances and con-
ditions surrounding the parties, the meaning is clear. 
The actual intention of the parties must prevail over 
dry words, inept expressions and careless recitations 
in the contract, unless the intentions are contrary to 
the plain sense and the binding words of the agree-
ment." 
It is submitted that the foregoing rules of construc-
tion should be considered for two purposes, ( 1 ) to give a 
general perspective to the litigation that the plaintiff is 
not attempting to take technical advantage of the young 
purchaser by way of any fodeiture, and ( 2) that the con-
tract cannot be construed to establish an intention be-
tween the parties to create the relationship of lessor and 
lessee. 
POINT 2. COURT DID NOT ERR IN HOLDING 
CONTRACT VIOLATED THE RULE AGAINST PER-
PETUITIES. 
Utah has no state statute of the uses, but the common 
law rule against perpetuities is recognized as a law of 
this state. 
70 C. J. S. 577 states the common law rule as follows: 
"The rule against perpetuities at common law, is that 
no interest within its scope is good unless it vests, if 
at all, not later than 21 years after some life in being 
at the creation of the interest ... " 
It appears now to be conceded that there is nothing 
in the contract that title would ever vest in the purchaser 
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since there is nothing in defendant's interpretation that 
would ever result in the payment for the property and 
the vesting of the legal title in the defendant. 
The case of Fisher vs. Bank of Spanish Fork, Utah, 
1937, 74 P. 2d, 659: 93 U. 514 was a suit to foreclose a 
crop mortgage on crops grown in 1935. The mortgage 
provided that it was a mortgage lien on all crops planted 
and grown in 1933, and until the debt secured by this 
mortgage is fully paid. 
The Court held that this was not a valid mortgage 
lien on crops grown after 1933. After talking about the 
indefiniteness and uncertainties the Court says at page 
662. 
"This is illustrated in another way by the rule against 
perpetuities which affects property in esse. The 
policy of the law is that it be freed from restrictions 
against alienation after a life or lives in being and 
21 years." 
The only claim on defendant's theory that the lang-
uage used in this case can be construed to fix a time for 
payment of principal of the purchase price is "option to 
pay an additional amount at any time." 
There seems to be no conflict in the many authorities 
that an option of this kind is void as it is against the rule 
of perpetuities. 
From Powell on Real Property, Volume V, Page 
611-12, we quote: 
"Options to purchase or to repurchase land uncon-
nected with a lease commonly denominated options 
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and gross have generally been held bad under the 
common law rule against perpetuities when not re-
stricted in durations so as to comply with the per-
missable period under rule. This result applies the 
rule against perpetuities as it should be applied to 
any future interest and specific property with social 
advantages in permitting the type of interest or not 
affirmativey proved to out weigh the social policy 
of the rule favoring alienability." 
In the case of Henderson vs. Bell, Kansas 1918, 173 
Pac. 1124, Headnote One states: 
"A contract giving an option to purchase real pro-
perty without limiting the time in which the purchase 
may be made is void for the reason that it violates 
the rule against perpetuities." 
In discussing this matter the Court says at page 1125. 
"By the contract, if Bell should elect to sell the pro-
perty he must first offer it to the Buchanans. The 
contract, if enforceable, gives the Buchanans the 
right to purchase the property at some future, 
indefinite and unknown time, and Bell can be com-
pelled to convey the property to the Buchanans at 
such time and for the price named. Bell cannot sell 
the property to any person without first offering it 
to those holding under the contract. When sold 
under the contract, the property must be sold at $65 
an acre, although at that time it may be worth $1,000 
an acre. Bell does not have absolute, uncontrolled 
right to sell the property at any time that he may see 
fit. It follows that the Buchanans and those holding 
under them, either as assignees or heirs, would hold a 
right to obtain an interest in the property running for 
an indefinite period of time. That right would be 
held in violation of the rule against perpetuity." 
This rule was cited with favor in Beloit Bldg Co. vs. 
Quinn et al, Kansas 1937, 66 P. 2d 549,552. which states: 
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"If it was a mere option to purchase at some remote 
time in the future, it would run headlong into the 
rule against perpetuities and the option would have 
been void." (citing cases) 
The Restatement of the Property Division IV, Section 
393 adopts the view that an option violates the rule against 
perpetuities unless the time for exercising the option is 
limited so as to conform to the rule against perpetuities. 
There are many cases in California holding attempts 
to create an interest in property void as against the rule. 
See Sahlenders Estate, Cal. 1948, 201 P. 2d, 69; John-
stons estate, Cal. 1956, 299 P. 2d 892; Heards Estate, Cal. 
1944 146 P. 2d, 725. 
Betchard vs. Iverson, Wash. 1949 212 P. 2d. 783, was 
a case construing a Will and the Court said at page 786. 
"The rule against perpetuities prohibits the creation 
of future interest which, by possibility may not be-
come vested within the life or lives in being at the 
time of the testators death and 21 years thereafter. 
Any limitation of a future interest which violates this 
rule is void. The purpose of the rule is to prevent 
the fettering of marketability of the property over 
long period of time by indirect restraints upon aliena-
tion. It is not a rule of construction, but a positive 
mandate of law to be applied irrespective of the 
intention of the testator. The proper procedure to 
determine the true construction of the Will just as 
if there were no such thing as a rule against perpetui-
ties and then to apply the rule rigorously in complete 
disregard of the wishes or intentions of the testator." 
The Estate of Annie Williams Lee, Wash., 299 P. 2d, 
1066, Headnote 3 states: 
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"If by any conceivable combination of circumstance 
it is possible that the event on which the estate or 
interest is limited may not occur within the period 
prescribed in the rule against perpetuities the limita-
tion is void." 
POINT 3. THIS CONTRACT IS NOT A LEASE. 
Defendant's counsel cites authorities apparently hold-
ing that the rules against perpetuities do not apply to long 
time leases. The authorities that he cites apply generally 
to oil and mineral leases or similar leases. We submit 
that mineral leases ordinarily are not perpetual leases, but 
their common provision provides that when production 
is discontinued for a time, usually fixed, and the royalties 
are paid thereunder, then the lease expires. There is 
nothing in the language of this contract that even squints 
at the proposition that the buyer should have a perpetual 
lease or possession of the farm, or that this is an agree-
ment to lease in perpetuity. The contract contains none 
of the usual provisions of a lease; such as a covenant not 
to commit waste, maintain the fence etc. No terms are 
expressed whatever that the defendant was to have pos-
session of the property unless he paid for it as a purchaser. 
There are numerous cases cited that the mere fact 
that a lease is for a longer period of 21 years does not 
violate the rule. This reference to the citation of authori-
ties finds no criticism from the plaintiffs. However, the 
note cited in 66 A.L.R. 2d, 733, makes a distinction be-
tween leases for a longer period than a term of 21 years or 
life, and a lease which is to take effect in the future at 
some uncertain period of which only becomes effective 
after the happening of some uncertain event. From this 
note we cite the following at page 733-734: 
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"The cases disclose uncertainties and to some extent 
conclusions in regard to the manner in which the 
common law n1le against perpetuities applies to leases 
for years or for other fixed or defined terms. Some 
of the difficulties are related to omissions to disting-
uish consistently in thought and terminology between 
future leases m;d future terms of leases." 
2. Leases in Futuro: "There can be doubt that 
leases fall within the rule requiring that estates to vest 
within the prescribed period, that is the period of 
the common law rule against perpetuities. (Citing) 
Haggerty vs. Oakland, 1958) 116 Cal. App. 2d, 407, 
326 P. 2d, 957-66 A. L. R. 2d, 718." 
"So a provision for a future lease which will not, or 
may not vest in interest within the period of the 
perpetuity of the rule is condemned by the rule." 
The real trouble with defendants authorities, as far 
as this case is concerned, is that this contract is not a 
lease. It was never drawn as a lease and a lease was 
never considered. The word lease is not to be found in 
the contract. This is escrow contract for purchase of 
land, in which the defendant agreed to purchase and the 
plaintiffs agreed to sell the property therein described. 
The controversy arises from the statement in the contract 
''$1,000 each October 1st thereafter until the full purchase 
price with interest on all deferred payments at the rate 
of 4}f% per annum from January 1, 1960," have been paid, 
should be construed to mean, "The Buyer is required to 
pay $1,000 per year on the contract and nothing more." 
This is the apparent interpretation that the Defendant 
insists upon. Since the $1)000 would not pay the interest, 
no title to the property agreed to be sold and purchased 
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would ever pass. For that reason, the contract must fall 
as in violation of the rule against perpetuities. If the 
Defendant had been willing to accept Plaintiffs interpre-
tation of contract, he would have been give 25 years in 
which to pay for this property with a low rate of interest 
of 4*%, which it is submitted is a very reasonable time in 
which to make his payments. If it had been intended to 
give a long time lease on this property, the document 
would not have been drawn as a partial payment pur-
chase price contract with a deed deposited in Escrow as 
was done in this case. We therefore, suggest that the 
argument of a long time present lease does not violate 
the rule against perpetuities and has no application what-
ever in this case, is without merit: 
By way of answer to the defendants brief, it is our 
contention that the quotes therein have nothing to do 
with the facts in this case. The defendant is attempting 
to claim a present interest to buy this property by reason 
of his option to pay more whenever he feels like paying 
more. The interpretation insisted upon by the defendant 
in this case does violate the rule against perpetuities in 
that defendant's title to that property would never vest 
because he would never pay for it. 
The trial court was clearly correct in refusing to 
adopt the interpretation sought to be placed upon the 
contract and insisted upon by the defendant. 
CONCLUSION 
The contract in question was a contract intended to 
be a contract of sale and not a lease. No court should 
look upon the facts of this case and read into this contract 
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or make a new contract for the parties that would permit 
the defendants to retain this property perpetually without 
paying the interest provided for in the contract or any 
part of the principal by merely paying $1,000.00 per year. 
The Judgment should be affirmed with costs awarded to 
the plaintiff. 
Respectfully submitted, 
HARRIS AND, HARRIS 
By M. C. Harris, 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs, 
and Respondent 
31 Federal Avenue 
Logan, Utah 
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